A new, detailed study has confirmed that Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and related extremist groups maintain a significant logistics hub in Sokoto State, even as questions grow over recent United States military air strikes in the north-west of Nigeria. The findings have sparked debate among analysts, politicians and local residents about why foreign forces targeted this part of the country and what it means for Nigeria’s long-running fight against violent groups.
The study, authored by James Barnett and Umar Musa and published by the Combating Terrorism Centre (CTC), shows that militants linked to the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP) and ISWAP have been moving through and operating in Sokoto and parts of northern Kebbi State for several years. According to the report, these militants use the area as a coordination and supply base, connecting fighters across Nigeria and the Sahel region.
While ISWAP is normally linked to north-east Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, the research suggests that cells and allied fighters — often known locally as Lakurawa — have also established networks in the north-west. The hub in Sokoto is believed to help militants share resources, plan movements, and move fighters and equipment between different regions. It also shows how fluid and spread-out Nigeria’s extremist threat has become over time.
On December 25, 2025, the United States carried out a series of air strikes in Sokoto State, targeting what officials described as Islamic State-linked militant sites. The operation followed weeks of planning and cooperation between Washington and Abuja, and was described by U.S. President Donald Trump as a move to strike back at militants responsible for attacks on civilians, especially Christians.
The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) said the strikes were carried out at the request of the Nigerian government. Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, confirmed joint planning and intelligence sharing was involved in the operation, stressing that both sides wanted to degrade extremist capabilities while respecting Nigeria’s sovereignty.
According to Reuters and other international sources, the strikes used Tomahawk cruise missiles launched by U.S. forces — possibly from a naval vessel — and fired into forest areas in Sokoto, including the Bauni forest in Tangaza Local Government Area. Nigeria’s information minister said that more than a dozen missiles hit two primary targets.
Despite official statements, many Sokoto residents and local leaders expressed confusion and fear after explosions were heard in rural communities near Jabo village in Tambuwal Local Government Area. Some villagers told reporters that they saw bright flashes in the sky and heard loud booms, but that no fighters or known extremist camps were visible in the area. No confirmed civilian deaths were reported.
Community members described Jabo and its surroundings as relatively peaceful places with little known extremist activity. Some outside observers have questioned whether the attack hit the correct targets, citing the absence of any historically known ISWAP or ISSP bases in that location. Critics also noted that Sokoto has seen more banditry and local conflicts than major jihadist operations compared with Nigeria’s north-east.
A former director-general of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) said the strike appeared to “miss the target” and landed in an empty field about 300 metres from a local hospital, raising concerns about precision and planning. He called for a full investigation into the intelligence used to select the target.
Nigeria’s government has defended the operation, saying it was part of a structured counter-terrorism partnership with the United States that includes intelligence sharing and coordinated action against extremist groups. Official spokespeople argued that such cooperation is a standard practice among countries facing common security threats.
Security analysts have offered mixed views. Some argue that using aerial strikes to hit logistics hubs could help disrupt militant movements in the long term, as these facilities are critical for planning and supply. Others caution that isolating Islamist groups in the north-west remains difficult, especially when many fighters operate in small, dispersed cells that blend into local communities.
Experts also warn that foreign military actions — especially if not paired with clear ground-based strategies — may not significantly weaken extremist organisations. Instead, such strikes could spark local resentment or even provide propaganda material for those groups.
Political leaders and civil society groups in Nigeria have urged transparency over the strikes. Some lawmakers, including representatives from Sokoto, have asked the federal government to explain how the target was chosen and what evidence supports claims that Islamic State affiliates are active in that area. There are concerns that foreign military involvement could become politically sensitive, especially in Nigeria’s multi-faith society.
Senator Aminu Tambuwal, representing Sokoto South, said Nigeria should broaden its anti-terror strategy and work with more international partners but must ensure local communities are not alienated or put at risk. Others emphasise that counter-terrorism efforts must be grounded in strong local intelligence and cooperation with community leaders.
The study confirming an ISWAP logistics hub in Sokoto sheds important light on how extremist networks have adapted and spread over several years. It highlights that threats are not limited to big, well-known terror centres in the north-east but may also appear in less obvious regions.
However, the controversy over the U.S. air strikes reflects a deeper problem: uncertainty about where extremist fighters are most active and how best to stop them. Without clear, shared information, both local populations and international partners may struggle to agree on goals and methods for military action.
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